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ABSTRACT
WIRELESS PHYSICAL-LAYER SECURITY PERFORMANCE OF
UWB SYSTEMS
SEPTEMBER 2011
MIYONG KO
B.S., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
M.S.E.C.E., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Dennis L. Goeckel
Traditionally, spread-spectrum systems have been employed to provide low probability-
of-intercept (LPI) and low probability-of-detection (LPD) performances at the physical
layer, but the messages transmitted over such a system are still encrypted with a powerful
cipher to protect their secrecy. Our challenge is to find a solution to provide an additional
level of security at the physical layer so that simple systems such as RFID tags with limited
resources can be secure without using standard encryption. It has recently been suggested
that the cryptographic security of the system can be enhanced by exploiting physical prop-
erties of UWB signals. With an eavesdropper observing the communications over mul-
tipath channels between two legitimate partners sharing a secret key of a limited length,
we consider both coherent and reference-based UWB schemes to enhance security. The
security of the legitimate nodes is achieved by signal attributes based on the secret key,
conferring an advantage over the adversary. We propose UWB signaling schemes to im-
prove physical layer security when the transmission is intended for coherent reception and
iv
TR reception. Among possible improvements, we consider removing the frame structure
of the UWB coherent signaling scheme, resulting in pulses that can be located anywhere
in the symbol period. Our proposed signaling schemes could potentially suggest a solution
for applications relying on conventional cryptography, especially for low-data rate RFID
systems.
v
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Securing the transmission of any message in wireless systems poses challenges since
the signal is not physically constrained. In general, encryption for securing such messages
is required at the digital layer via some sort of powerful ciphers. However, low-power wire-
less systems such as radio frequency identification (RFID) systems lack sufficient power
and resources to operate powerful encryption algorithms. Thus, it has recently been sug-
gested that some level of cryptographic security of the system can be enhanced at the phys-
ical layer by exploiting physical properties of wideband signals [14]. This could prove
highly desirable in extremely low-power RFID systems; hence, marrying a lighter-weight
cryptographic protocol to an enhancing physical layer is attractive.
In particular, as one way to use characteristics of wideband signals for increased secu-
rity at the physical layer, consider the case of the transmitter and receiver sharing a common
key. This common key could be used to establish the hopping pattern of a frequency-
hopped (FH) system or the spreading code in a code-division multiple-access (CDMA)
system. However, a frequency-hopped system wherein relatively narrowband signals are
hopped across a wide bandwidth consumes considerable power for hopping over the large
bandwidth. In a direct-sequence spread-spectrum, on the other hand, signals are signifi-
cantly shorter in time and wider in frequency. However, like the FH system, the CDMA
system is problematic for a low-power system because of the energy expended for a given
level of security. Both of these systems are not power efficient for encryption done at the
physical layer; thus, they cannot perform as the power-saving solutions for extremely low-
1
power RFID applications. We hereby advocate an extremely low-power ultra-wideband
(UWB) architecture for encryption at the physical layer.
UWB systems must follow strict federal communications commission (FCC) regula-
tions limiting the UWB bandwidth, power spectral density emission and data rates in order
to avoid interference with other existing systems. Accordingly, UWB systems have been
proven to consume very low power due to power limitations imposed by the FCC. The
extremely large bandwidth of UWB signals makes UWB transmissions more resistant to
interference than narrow band transmissions. Furthermore, UWB transmission has been
widely adopted in recent years because of increasing demand for portable devices pro-
viding high data rates at lower power for short range wireless applications. Accordingly,
ultra-wideband (UWB) communication systems have attracted considerable attention both
because of their extremely low-power architecture, thereby avoiding interference by con-
ventional receivers, and a potentially robust physical layer security as a consequence of
their large bandwidth.
In this work we propose signaling models for providing some level of encryption at
the physical layer by using an extremely low-power UWB architecture, which can be a
lower power solution than traditional encryption algorithms for the same level of security
assurance. Then, we investigate the abilities of UWB systems employing a pulse of an
ultra-wideband spectrum bandwidth to provide such physical layer cryptographic security.
The proposed signaling models are based on a time-hopping (TH) method and binary pulse
amplitude modulation. We assume that a randomly generated secret key is shared by two
communicating parties, i.e., an RFID tag and a legitimate receiver. This shared key is
used to determine the UWB pulse locations. The utility of the proposed UWB signaling
models is based on the legitimate receiver’s identifying the pulse locations via the secret
key, thus conferring an advantage over any adversary lacking any knowledge of the time
slots employed to transmit a data bit. Thus, we examine the security performance in terms
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of the ability of the legitimate receiver to decode data versus the ability of the eavesdropper
to ascertain the key as directed by potential cryptographic protocols [7].
Our proposed thesis work is divided into two research studies. The first part proposes
UWB signaling models with the standard frame structure as a means to secure physical
transmission. That is, in order to convey symbol bits, there are multiple frames in one sym-
bol period with only one pulse being located in each frame. In this study we consider two
receiver implementations in UWB systems: a coherent UWB communication system and a
UWB transmitted-reference (TR) noncoherent communication system. In UWB systems,
performance, receiver complexity, power consumption and cost are all considered in decid-
ing whether to utilize coherent or noncoherent reception. Coherent UWB systems call for a
sophisticated receiver design in order to estimate channel information. Thus, the complex-
ity of coherent UWB communication systems tends to increase in order to achieve robust
performance. In general, coherent UWB systems are regarded as superior to noncoherent
UWB systems in performance but at the expense of significant receiver complexity. In
contrast, noncoherent UWB systems can provide a simpler receiver structure by avoiding
the complicated channel estimation inherent in extreme bandwidth. The performance of
coherent and noncoherent UWB systems has been analyzed [10, 5]. However, to the best
of our knowledge, there have been no studies investigating the ability of UWB systems to
support higher-layer cryptographic protocols. In particular, the tradeoffs between security
performance and receiver complexity in multipath fading channels have not yet been ex-
amined. Therefore, we provide an accurate security performance analysis of the baseline
UWB system intended for coherent reception and of the baseline UWB system intended for
reference-based reception with both systems using the proposed UWB signaling schemes.
We utilize a numerical evaluation to rate the security performance of the legitimate receiver
in decoding data versus the adversary to ascertain the key.
The second part of our research explores improving the signaling schemes proposed in
the first part. The proposed schemes can be improved in numerous ways. Among them
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we consider removal of the frame structure in both the UWB coherent and TR signaling
models. For simplicity, we consider only coherent reception. Thus, we propose a UWB
signaling model of a frameless structure designed for coherent reception. In general, in a
UWB system intended for coherent reception, one symbol is represented by a sequence of
pulses with each pulse being located in an interval designated a frame. That is, the typical
frame is composed of multiple time slots among which only one pulse is assigned. How-
ever, we investigate removing this frame structure so that the multiple pulses representing
one bit can be placed anywhere in one symbol period without restriction. We expect that
doing so may make it more challenging for the adversary to detect the pulses because of
expanded pulse search space. To evaluate this, we investigate the ability of the adversary
to detect the pulses correctly when the signal scheme of a frameless structure intended for
coherent reception is adopted. Then, we compare performance to that of the UWB coher-
ent signaling scheme with a frame structure previously employed in the first portion of our
research. By doing so, we study whether this frameless signaling scheme provides better
security performance than the conventional framed signaling scheme.
In this chapter we will first present a brief background helpful to understanding our
framework, and then we will summarize our contributions.
1.1 Background
Ultra-wideband (UWB) communication systems have recently received considerable
attention in academia and industry for short-range, low-power applications in wireless sys-
tems. UWB communications involve the transmission of impulses with a large bandwidth
at a low transmission power. This extremely low-power transmission of UWB signals
insuring that impulse radio signals do not interfere with already-existing narrowband ra-
dio systems has motivated the FCC to allocate a UWB spectrum in the range of 3.1 GHz
to 10.6 GHz, some of which is already dedicated to other radios. More specifically, the
UWB pulses possess a bandwidth over 500 MHz or exceeding 20% of the system cen-
4
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Figure 1.1. Picture of the time (horizontal) and frequency (vertical) space of dimension 
x F with an ultra-wideband time-hopped approach to allocation
ter frequency. Such a large bandwidth offers low probability-of-intercept (LPI) and low
probability-of-detection (LPD) in conjunction with the extremely low power spectral den-
sity. Each symbol is transmitted at a low duty cycle over a large number of frames with only
one pulse per frame in order to concentrate sufficient symbol energy for reliable detection
while maintaining very low-power density.
The system of interest exploits a low-power transmitter of ultra-wideband with a large
time-bandwidth space to provide the desired cryptographic solution. Consider a time-
hopping UWB system employing a pulse with an ultra-wide bandwidth. Assume that the
goal of this system is to convey Nb data bits through a large bandwidth of size F in 
seconds. For wideband systems, each data bit is generally conveyed by a sequence of Np
pulses. The pulse of a duration Tp is employed, which has bandwidth given byW = g=Tp,
where g is slightly larger than one. Thus, each pulse occupies a rectangular tile of size Tp
x W in a time x frequency plane. As shown in Fig. 1.1, we employ a pulse spanning the
entire band with nominal value of W = 7 GHz. The time space  has multiple time slots.
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Figure 1.2. Conventional time-hopping UWB signaling scheme
The shared secret key determines which time slots are filled. Obviously, since a UWB pulse
signal transmitted at lower power is buried in noise, this makes it difficult for the receiver
to extract the signal. However, the intended receiver knows where to look since the receiver
knows the sequence of timings employed. This is a linear search using a template to find
the correct timing offset of the bit sequence start. When the receiver notes a large energy
spike in the output of its template matching, it presumes it has detected the correct timing.
However, the challenge for the adversary is greater due to no knowledge of the time slots
employed. We assume no limitation on the computational power of the adversary. The
adversary is also able to completely sample the bandwidth of the system at all times. Even
with this, the adversary has to confront a number of hypothesis testing problems to find
the correct NbNp transmission slots. This difference between the abilities of the intended
receiver and the adversary, thereby rendering some level of encryption at the physical layer,
is what we intend to exploit.
For example, assume that a train of UWB pulses to represent one data bit is transmitted
in one symbol period with one pulse being located in each frame as shown in Fig. 1:2. The
pulse location in each frame is determined by the b-bit secret key shared by the transmitter
and the intended receiver. Thus, each pulse in each frame is located at the same time slot
designated by the secret key. The intended receiver does not need to run the hypothesis test
to determine which time slot has the data pulse. However, the adversary has to perform a
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large number of hypothesis tests due to its lacking the secret key. For example, assume that
10-bit secret key is used. In this case, finding the correct time slots is an 210 hypothesis
testing problem, which means that the number of hypotheses dramatically escalates. Even
if we ignore the computational constraint, the probability of finding the correct sequence
of time slots rapidly diminishes to zero.
1.2 Contribution
Our major contributions in this work are as follows:
 Proposing low-power UWB signaling schemes to provide some level of encryption at
the physical layer when the transmission of signals is intended for coherent reception
and TR reception,
 Suggesting that the UWB TR systems outperform the coherent UWB systems in
terms of performance of the desired receiver versus that of the adversary, and
 Proposing a frameless signaling scheme when the transmission is intended for coher-
ent reception to offer enhanced physical layer security.
1.3 Organization
In Chapter 2, we introduce UWB signaling schemes for both the system intended for
coherent reception and the TR system. Next, we derive error probabilities of the legiti-
mate receiver and the adversary when the transmission is intended for coherent reception
and TR reception. Then, we present numerical evaluation of the physical layer security
performance for both systems operating in IEEE 802.15.4a environments. In Chapter 3,
we propose a UWB signaling scheme with a frameless structure when the transmission is
intended for coherent reception. In addition, we derive the tradeoffs in the security per-
formance of the UWB coherent system employing this frameless signaling scheme and the
7
UWB coherent system of a framed structure previously proposed in Chapter 2. Finally, in
Chapter 4 we summarize our thesis work based on the results from Chapters 2 and 3.
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CHAPTER 2
PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY PERFORMANCE OF BASELINE
COHERENT AND TR SIGNALING SCHEMES
In this chapter we propose UWB signaling models to enhance secure transmission by
utilizing physical properties of UWB signals. The proposed signaling models are based on
a time-hopping (TH) method and binary pulse amplitude modulation. It is assumed that a
randomly generated secret key is shared by two communicating parties, i.e., an RFID tag
and a legitimate receiver. This shared key is used to determine the UWB pulse locations.
We examine the security performance in terms of the ability of the legitimate receiver to
decode data versus the ability of the eavesdropper to ascertain the key as motivated by
potential cryptographic protocols [7].
We derive the error probabilities of both the legitimate UWB receiver and adversary
when the transmission is intended for coherent reception, and then those of the legitimate
UWB receiver and adversary when the transmission is intended for reference-based recep-
tion. Since the quantities of interest are in integral form, analytical evaluation is very dif-
ficult. Accordingly, we present numerical results for systems operating in IEEE 802.15.4a
environments [4]. Finally we discuss our proposed schemes as a possible solution for the
near-far problem that plagues PHY-based security in the wireless environment and consider
ways to further improve security of signal transmission using the UWB schemes.
The proposed scheme may offer a potentially effective solution for applications which
rely on conventional cryptography for secure communications. In particular, the proposed
UWB signaling schemes can be adapted to a low-data rate RFID system with a simple
tag but with a reader of higher complexity, thereby making available possible UWB TR
9
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Figure 2.1. UWB signaling scheme intended for coherent reception
approaches and perhaps coherent approaches, both of which would be difficult in low-
power integrated circuits [6].
2.1 System Models
Given peak power constraints on UWB hardware, particularly in emerging CMOS tech-
nologies with small feature sizes, there will often be a large number of short UWB pulses
to convey a data bit [10, 8]. Assume that a randomly generated b-bit secret keyK is shared
by a transmitter and a legitimate receiver. A single user that employs a TH method and
binary pulse amplitude modulation will be assumed throughout this work. Without loss of
generality, a signal carrying the first data bit b0 mapped to f  1; 1g with equal probability
in the first symbol period is considered.
2.1.1 UWB signaling scheme intended for coherent reception
We employ the b-bit secret keyK to position the UWB pulses within the symbol period
Ts. In contrast to traditional spread-spectrum systems, we do not employ a shift register
with connections determined by the key to produce a longer pseudo-random noise (PN)
sequence, since this does not improve the cryptographic strength of the system [12]. Fig.
2.1 illustrates a UWB signaling scheme intended for coherent detection. Ideally, each pulse
would be independently located using key bits, but keys are generally not long enough to
support such. Hence, we divide the b-bit shared key K into m parts K = (1; 2; :::; m)
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Figure 2.2. UWB signaling scheme intended for TR reception
to utilize the limited key bits, and each i consisting of b=m bits, i 2 f 1; 2; :::;m g , is
used to select a position index in f 0; 1; :::; 2b=m   1g that is shared by the pulses in the
corresponding Nf=m frames.
More formally, a transmitted signal s0(t) carrying the first information bit b0 over the
first symbol period as shown in Fig. 2.1 is considered, and the signal transmitted by a single
user can be expressed by:
s0(t) =
Nf 1X
k=0
(  1)b0pEp p(t   kTf   c0;bk=mcTp); (2.1)
where p(  ) is a normalized standard UWB pulse of approximate duration Tp and
R +1
 1 j p(t)j 2dt =
1. The transmission energy of each pulse is Ep = Es=Nf where Es is the symbol energy
andNf is the number of frames in one symbol period. The symbol period Ts = NfTf , Tf is
the frame period, and f c0;bk=mc g Nf 1k=1 is the TH sequence. Specifically, the TH code element
c0;bk=mc 2 f 0; 1; :::; 2b=m   1g for positioning the UWB pulse in the kth frame is deter-
mined by the b=m key bits bk=mc+1. Hence, the pulse location in frames 0; 1; :::; m   1 is
determined by 1, the pulse location in frames m;m+ 1; :::; 2m   1 is determined by 2,
etc.
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2.1.2 UWB TR signaling scheme
Fig. 2.2 illustrates the UWB TR signaling scheme, where each frame consists of two
pulses: a reference pulse and a data pulse. A transmitted signal s0;tr(t) of a UWB TR
system over the first symbol interval can be written as:
s0;tr(t) =
Nf 1X
k=0
(
p
Es=2 p(t   kTf   k)
+ (   1)b0
p
Es=2 p(t   kTf   k   D   c0;bk=mcTp)); (2.2)
where the previous parameters specified in (2.1) hold in (2.2). In frame k, the reference
pulse is transmitted first and the data pulse follows with a delay D + c0;bk=mcTp. Thus,
unlike the UWB signaling scheme for coherent reception shown in Fig. 2.1, the key bits
i are used to determine not the data pulse locations but rather the time delay c0;bk=mcTp
between the reference pulse and the data pulse. Thus, the time delay c0;bk=mcTp in each
group of Nf=m frames remains invariant. The fixed time delay D, D > max, is employed
to prevent inter-pulse interference between the reference pulse and the data pulse after
passing through the channel, where max is the maximum delay spread of the channel. The
variable k indicates the starting time of the reference pulse in the kth frame, which varies in
a true random manner in the proposed UWB TR signaling scheme. For example, although
a time separation c0;0Tp between the reference and data pulses determined by the first key
bits 1 is constant in the first Nf=m frames, the actual location in each frame will vary
according to the random offsets. These random offsets keep the UWB TR adversary from
detecting the transmitted signal coherently by using the reference pulse to estimate channel
information. Note that a transmitter can generate this true random location with extremely
low-power circuitry (0.57 pJ=bit) [11], and that a TR receiver does not require knowledge
of the offset k (and, hence, these random bits) to decode the signal.
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2.2 Performance of Systems Intended for Coherent Reception
Consider the transmission of the signal s0(t) over a frequency-selective multipath chan-
nel appropriate for the wireless UWB system. The channel impulse response will be given
by a standard discrete-path model as:
h(t) =
L 1X
l=0
hl(t   l); (2.3)
where hl denotes the attenuation factor, l is the time delay associated with the lth prop-
agation path, and L is the number of multipath components. Assume that the channel is
time-invariant over one symbol period so that all of the pulses in a symbol period will go
through the same channel.
The received signal can be expressed as:
r0(t) = h(t)  s0(t) + n(t) (2.4)
where n(t) is a zero-mean white Gaussian noise with two-sided power spectral density
N0=2.
2.2.1 Legitimate receiver
Since precise timing is required by the legitimate receiver, we will assume that beacons
have allowed for timing and channel estimation for both the legitimate UWB receiver and
adversary. A template signal perfectly matched to the pulse sequence of the received signal
in the first symbol period is given by:
stemp(t) =
1p
Nf
Nf 1X
j=0
p(t   jTf   c0;bj=mcTp): (2.5)
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Assuming a maximal ratio combining approach, the decision statistic after combining the
outputs of the correlators can be written as:
y0 =
L 1X
l=0
hl
Z Ts
0
r0(t) stemp(t   l) dt
=
L 1X
l=0
hl
Z Ts
0
(h(t)  s0(t)) stemp(t   l) dt+ n0; (2.6)
where n0 =
PL 1
l=0 hl
R Ts
0
n(t)stemp(t   l)dt is Gaussian-distributed with zero mean and
variance N0
2
PL 1
l=0 hl
2. Thus, the decoding error probability for the legitimate receiver with
knowledge of the data pulse locations when conditioned on f hl g L 1l=0 is given in [2] by:
Pe; rcv = Ehl
24Q
0@s2EsPL 1l=0 h2l
N0
1A35 : (2.7)
2.2.2 Adversary
Since a UWB signal at a low power level is buried in noise, finding the information
data pulse can be very challenging without knowledge of the pulse locations. In order to
provide a lower bound on security performance, we consider the worst case scenario to the
legitimate receiver where the adversary knows the transmitted bit. This might occur, for
example, if the adversary is able to exploit some sort of packet structure. More formally,
consider the first Nf=m frames, where data pulses are located at the identical time slot in
each frame, and thus a template signal when the pulse is in the time slot i is given by:
stemp;i(t) = (   1)b0 1p
Nf
Nf=m 1X
j=0
p(t   jTf   ~c0;iTp); (2.8)
where i 2 f 0; 1; :::; 2b=m   1g . Assuming the adversary uses the maximal ratio combining
technique, the decision statistic after combining the outputs of the correlators for the first
Nf=m frames is given by:
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y0;i =
L 1X
l=0
hl
Z NfTf=m
0
r0(t) stemp;i(t   l) dt
=
L 1X
l=0
hl
Z NfTf=m
0
(h(t)  s0(t)) stemp;i(t   l) dt+ n0;i; (2.9)
where n0;i =
PL 1
l=0 hl
R NfTf=m
0
n(t)stemp;i(t   l)dt is Gaussian-distributed with zero mean
and variance N0
2
PL 1
l=0 hl
2. The adversary has to confront a large number of hypotheses,
since there is only one data pulse but many empty slots in each frame due to the extreme
bandwidth expansion. We assume the adversary employs the template at various delays,
and picks the output with the largest value. The adversary with the assumed knowledge of
the channel could instead perform a sophisticated hypothesis test, but our main conclusion
is based on the adversary performing well in the coherent case, and thus a lower bound to
the adversary performance suffices.
Noting
y0;c0;0  N(0; 2)
and y0;i  N(i; 2); i 6= c0;0;
where
0 =
Es
m
L 1X
l=0
h2l
i =
8>>><>>>:
Es
m
L ji c0;0j 1X
l=0
hlhl+ji c0;0j; c0;0   L < i < c0;0 + L;
0; otherwise
and
2 =
N0
2
L 1X
l=0
h2l ;
the probability of finding the correct pulse position in the first Nf=m frames conditioned
upon f hl g L 1l=0 is easily extended from the coherent reception of orthogonal signals [9]:
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Pc; adv; 0jhl
= P (y0;i < y0;c0;0 ; 8 i 6= c0;0 j hl)
=
Z 1
 1
2b=m 1Y
i=0;i 6=c0;0

1   Q

r   i


 1p
2
e 
(r 0)2
22 dr: (2.10)
Since the TH codes for each group of Nf=m frames are independently assigned by each of
1; 2; :::; m, the probability of error of the adversary for finding the entire key is obtained
by averaging over the channel realization:
Pe; adv = 1   Ehl
h
(Pc; adv; 0jhl)
m
i
: (2.11)
Note that partial keys also yield some utility to the adversary, since they weaken the system
security if key refresh schemes are not employed, but we adopt the probability of obtaining
the whole key since partial key capture can be combatted at higher layers.
2.3 Performance of TR Systems
For performance analysis, assume the channel is constant over the symbol period, al-
though we hasten to note that the system functions well if the channel is constant only over
the frame duration so that the reference pulse in each frame goes through the same channel
as the data pulse. The maximum delay spread of the channel max is assumed to be smaller
than the minimal separation D in order to avoid interference between the reference and
data pulses, and Tf is assumed large enough to assure no inter-frame interference. Note
that these assumptions are easily satisfied in the relatively low-data rate RFID applications
envisioned.
The received signal passes through a noise-limiting low-pass filter with sufficiently
wide bandwidthW at the front end of the receiver. The filtered received signal is given by:
~r0;tr(t) = h(t)  s0;tr(t) + ~n(t); (2.12)
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where ~r0;tr(t) is r0;tr(t) filtered by the low-pass filter, ~n(t) is a zero-mean Gaussian noise
with power spectral density Sn(f) = j H(f)j 2N02 , and H(f) is the frequency response of
the filter.
2.3.1 Legitimate receiver
Knowing the sequence (c0;0; c0;1; :::) indicating the separations between the reference
pulses and the data pulses, the legitimate UWB TR receiver correlates the filtered received
signal ~r0;tr(t) with its delayed version ~r0;tr(t   D   c0;bk=mcTp) in the kth frame and sums
over all frames; that is, the integrator output corresponding to the first symbol period is
given by:
y0 =
Nf 1X
k=0
Z (k+1)Tf
kTf
~r0;tr(t) ~r0;tr(t   D   c0;bk=mcTp) dt: (2.13)
The error probability of the legitimate UWB TR receiver conditioned upon f hl g L 1l=0 ac-
cording to the Gaussian approximation can be derived in [6] and thus the decoding error
probability of the legitimate UWB TR receiver when averaged over the multipath channel
becomes:
Pe; TR rcv = Ehl
24Q
0@ EsPL 1l=0 h2lq
4EsN0
PL 1
l=0 h
2
l + 2TsN
2
0W
1A35 : (2.14)
Note that this receiver obtains this performance without requiring knowledge of the random
offsets k.
2.3.2 Adversary
We assume that the true random k offsets keep the adversary from doing channel es-
timation based on methods such as template averaging [2]. Thus, the UWB TR adversary,
lacking knowledge of the delay D + c0;bk=mcTp between the reference and data pulses but
with knowledge of the data bit b0, correlates the filtered received signal ~r0;tr(t) with the
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delayed version (  1)b0~r0;tr(t   D   iTp) for i = 0; 1; :::; 2k=m   1, and for each i, sums
all of the correlation outputs corresponding to Nf=m pulses. The integrator output y0;i for
the first Nf=m frames follows as:
y0;i = (   1)b0
Nf=m 1X
k=0
Z (k+1)Tf
kTf
~r0;tr(t) ~r0;tr(t   D   iTp) dt: (2.15)
The decision statistic y0;i can be approximated as a Gaussian random variable as suggested
in [6, 1]. The adversary selects the index of the delay corresponding to the largest correlator
output. As in the coherent case, a more sophisticated hypothesis test could be performed,
but, in the TR case, this is further complicated and gains limited because of the lack of
knowledge of the channel.
Noting
y0;c0;0  N(0; 2)
and y0;i  N(i; 2); i 6= c0;0;
where
0 =
Es
2m
L 1X
l=0
h2l
i =
8>>><>>>:
Es
2m
L ji c0;0j 1X
l=0
hlhl+ji c0;0j; c0;0   L < i < c0;0 + L;
0; otherwise
and
2 =
EsN0
m
L 1X
l=0
h2l +
TsN0
2W
2
;
the probability for finding the separation employed by the TR system in the first group of
Nf=m frames is found in an analogous fashion to (2.10):
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Figure 2.3. Comparison of security of UWB system intended for coherent reception and
TR system in IEEE 802.15.4a LOS office environments. The x-axis denotes in log scale
the error probability of the legitimate receivers in decoding the data bit while the y-axis
denotes in log scale the probability of the adversaries correctly determining the key. At the
same error probability for the legitimate receivers, the adversary in the coherent reception
case is more effective.
Pc; TR adv; 0jh
=
Z 1
 1
2b=m 1Y
i=0;i 6=c0;0

1   Q

r   i


 1p
2
e 
(r 0)2
22 dr: (2.16)
Thus, the probability of the TR adversary not being able to determine the key over multipath
channels is:
Pe; TR adv = 1   Ehl
h
(Pc; tr adv; 0jhl)
m
i
: (2.17)
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Figure 2.4. Comparison of security of UWB system intended for coherent reception and
TR system in IEEE 802.15.4a LOS outdoor environments. The x-axis denotes in log scale
the error probability of the legitimate receivers in decoding the data bit while the y-axis
denotes in log scale the probability of the adversaries correctly determining the key. At the
same error probability for the legitimate receivers, the adversary in the coherent reception
case is more effective.
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2.4 Semi-Analytic Simulations
The tradeoffs in performance of the legitimate receiver and the adversary for both co-
herent and TR reception are considered. For these plots, the received SNR is assumed to
be the same at the intended receiver and the adversary. We consider the problem of a near
adversary and far receiver below. IEEE 802.15.4a channel models [4] are considered.
Figs. 2.3 and 2.4 illustrate the security of the UWB systems when the proposed signal-
ing schemes are used under IEEE 802.15.4a LOS office and LOS outdoor channel models,
respectively. For the simulation parameters, we utilize a 30-bit secret key and divide it
into 5 parts (m=5). Assume a low-data rate application of 100 Kbps. Each symbol period
of 10 s consists of 25 frames, each being 400 ns long. Therefore, each set of 6 bits is
independently used to identify the pulse locations in the corresponding group of 5 frames.
The bandwidth is 8 GHz yielding a pulse width of approximately 125 ps. For the simula-
tion of the UWB TR system, we assume that D is fixed at 100 ns to assure no inter-pulse
interference.
From the figures, the error probability of the difficult hypothesis test for the adversary is
much worse than that of the legitimate receiver in both the system intended for coherent re-
ception and the TR system. This is expected since finding the time slots with the randomly
assigned data pulses is very difficult for adversaries without first learning the b-bit secret
key. Note that the difficulty of the hypothesis test is caused not only by the large number
of hypotheses, but also by the ringing of the UWB channel, which makes it difficult to
separate hypotheses. Interestingly, both Figs. 2.3 and 2.4 demonstrate that the baseline
UWB TR scheme provides better security than the baseline coherent UWB scheme. For
example, at the low signal-to-noise (SNR) range in Fig. 2.3, when the error probability of
the legitimate receivers in both systems is 10 2, the error probabilities of the adversaries in
the UWB system intended for coherent reception and UWB TR system are approximately
1   10 4 and 1   10 6, respectively.
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The error probabilities of the legitimate receiver and adversary in the systems intended
for coherent reception (2.7), (2.11) are not affected by the bandwidthW , whereas the error
probabilities of the legitimate receiver and adversary in the TR systems (2.14), (2.17) are
functions of the bandwidth W . The numerical results obtained by varying the bandwidth
W show that the larger the bandwidth W used, the higher the probability of error for
the adversary of TR reception, resulting in better security performance for the UWB TR
systems.
2.5 Discussion
2.5.1 Near-far problem
One challenge to all physical-layer security protocols is the near-far problem. In par-
ticular, an eavesdropper near the transmitter can have a significant SNR advantage over
the desired receiver. More troubling is that one often cannot assume knowledge of the
receiver position, thus making it difficult to even choose the secrecy rate at which all of
the recent schemes based on [13] should transmit. Hence, it is desirable to consider how
robust the proposed schemes of the fixed rate are for eavesdroppers that have significant
SNR advantages over the desired receiver.
Fig. 2.5 shows the error probabilities of the legitimate receiver and the adversary when
the transmission is intended for coherent reception vs. the SNR. Consider when the error
probability for both the legitimate receiver and the adversary is 10 1. The legitimate re-
ceiver obtains 30:79 dB for the error probability of 10 1 while the adversary needs 43:36
dB to obtain the same error probability. Since the energy is inversely proportional to the
square of distance, if the legitimate receiver is not farther than 4:77 times the distance of
the adversary from the transmitter, the error probability of the legitimate receiver is smaller
than that of the adversary, circumventing any near-far problem.
Further numerical results (not shown) demonstrate it is very difficult for adversaries
to detect a transmitted signal over a large SNR range. In particular, even when the re-
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Figure 2.5. Error probabilities of UWB systems intended for TR reception vs. SNR. The
x-axis denotes SNR (dB) while the y-axis denotes the error probabilities of the legitimate
receiver and the adversary when transmission is intended for coherent reception.
ceived SNR of the desired receiver is driven very high (corresponding to extremely low
probabilities of error), the minimum error probability of the adversary is still high. This
demonstrates that even when an adversary is near the transmitter while a legitimate receiver
is located distantly from the transmitter, the adversary will have difficulty in detecting the
transmitted signal. This complication for the adversary comes from the long “ringing” of
the UWB channel, which is particularly hard for the adversary to deal with, even with so-
phisticated receivers, in the TR case. Longer keys and wider bandwidths will also improve
this promising near-far resiliency.
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2.5.2 Comments on the comparison and improvement of each scheme
The comparison provided in this thesis work considers only baseline systems and thus
should be carefully considered before making firm decisions on eventual utility. Here we
comment on this comparison and future directions for improving each of the systems.
First, consider each of the systems when the adversary employs a more complicated
hypothesis test that takes into account the confusion of the hypotheses caused by the chan-
nel. For the system intended for coherent reception, it is relatively straightforward for the
UWB adversary to use the equations presented in this work to conduct such a hypothesis
test, although we could complicate this somewhat with a more complicated mapping to
pulse locations from the key bits. However, since the UWB TR adversary is not able to es-
timate the channel parameters, it would be much harder for the adversary to perform such
a hypothesis test from the analogous set of equations in that case.
We also have assumed perfect timing for both the receiver and the adversary in both
the system intended for coherent reception and in the TR system. In the system intended
for coherent reception, this is reasonable since the assumed beacons easily provide such.
However, in a TR system, the reader and adversary would have to perform such. Since the
TR system knows the key, this is a standard exercise, but the adversary would have a much
more difficult task to figure out not only symbol boundaries, but also the locations where
the system switches from one part of the key to another.
Finally, we are considering future enhancements that will facilitate improvement on
the baseline systems employing coherent and reference-based reception. One could easily
argue that the comparison here is not fair to the coherent system, since a given tradeoff on
its performance curves in Figs. 2.3 and 2.4 might come at a lower transmit power than the
one compared to on the TR curve. Increasing the pulse power in the coherent system to try
to equalize such does not help, because it just moves one along the performance curves in
Figs. 2.3 and 2.4. However, there are multiple possibilities to employ excess power.
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One potential scheme is to produce dummy pulses in some of the frames to confuse
the adversary. The adversary would be just as likely to choose a dummy pulse as the real
one, and the reader would only be mildly affected by inter-pulse interference on the pulse
in which it is interested.
For example, Fig. 2.6 illustrates the security of the UWB systems intended for coherent
reception for a different number of dummy pulses and TR system in IEEE 802.15.4a LOS
office environments. Since the UWB system intended for coherent reception uses less
transmit power, extra dummy pulses can be generated with excess power. For comparison,
the UWB systems intended for coherent reception generating a different number of dummy
pulses in each frame with excess power is considered. As the number of chaff pulses in
each frame increases, the error probability of the adversary increases since the adversary
has no knowledge of the real data pulse location among the transmitted pulses.
Consider the case that the error probability of the legitimate receiver is 10 2. To obtain
this error probability, the energies used to transmit pulses in one symbol period in the
UWB systems intended for coherent reception and TR reception are respectively 7:78 dB
and 33:80 dB. This implies the coherent system could employ many dummy pulses to
confuse the adversary if synchronization is not affected. Up to a maximum of 2 dummy
pulses, security performance of the UWB TR system still remains superior to that of the
coherent UWB system for the error probability of the legitimate receiver of 10 2. However,
if there are more than 2 dummy pulses generatedin the coherent system, then the coherent
UWB system outperforms the UWB TR system.
One another possible improvement being considered is to remove the frame structure
in both the UWB coherent and TR signaling models. In UWB coherent signaling, pulses
can be placed anywhere in one symbol period based on the entire secret key. In UWB
TR signaling, the key could be mapped to a tuning of the autocorrelation function of the
transmitted signal across an entire symbol period. Doing so in either signaling scheme may
make it more challenging for the adversary to detect pulses because of the expanded search
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Figure 2.6. Comparison of security of UWB systems intended for coherent reception gen-
erating dummy pulses and TR system in IEEE 802.15.4a LOS office environments. The
x-axis denotes in log scale the error probability of the legitimate receivers in decoding the
data bit while the y-axis denotes in log scale the probability of the adversaries correctly
determining the key.
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space. In the following chapter we investigate whether removing the frame structure in
UWB coherent signaling can provide better security performance.
2.6 Conclusion
In this thesis work we proposed a UWB signaling model to strengthen physical layer se-
curity. We examined the security performance of both baseline coherent and TR signaling
schemes numerically in IEEE 802.15.4a environments. These numerical results demon-
strate that, for the baseline systems considered, the security performance of the TR system
is better than that of the system intended for coherent reception. There are numerous ways
in which each of the schemes can be improved and many adversary models that can be
adopted. We are currently pursuing such in conjunction with lightweight cryptographic
protocols to be employed over the UWB system. We hope this work also motivates further
work of others in this important area.
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CHAPTER 3
FRAMELESS UWB
In this chapter we propose a UWB signaling scheme with a frameless structure when the
transmission is intended for coherent reception. As in the previous chapter, the proposed
signaling scheme is based on a TH method and binary pulse amplitude modulation. We
assume that a randomly generated b-bit secret key K is used to determine the UWB pulse
positions in both the framed and frameless signaling schemes to allow comparison of their
security performances. Here we consider the transmission of the signals over the additive
white gaussian noise (AWGN) channel. Like those in the previous chapter, a signal carrying
the first data bit b0 mapped to f  1; 1g with equal probability in the first symbol period is
considered.
Since the legitimate receiver shares the secret key K and thus knows where to search
for the pulses, the probability of the legitimate receiver not being able to decode the data
remains the same for both signaling schemes. We examine the security performance in
terms of the ability of the adversary using the signaling scheme with a frame structure to
detect the key versus the ability of the adversary using the signaling scheme with a frame-
less structure to ascertain the key when both signaling schemes are intended for coherent
reception.
First, we derive the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the number of key bits
that the adversary can detect when the signaling scheme is based on a framed structure
intended for coherent reception as shown in Fig. 3.1 which is similar to that of Fig. 2.1
in Chapter 2. For simplicity, we do not consider repetition of the pulses. We obtain an
analogous CDF when the frameless signaling scheme is intended for coherent reception as
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Figure 3.1. Signaling scheme with a frame structure intended for coherent reception
illustrated in Fig. 3.2 is employed. We first assume that both systems use the same secret
key K to locate data pulses, resulting in a different number of pulses in each signaling
scheme. On the other hand, we can consider the case that there is no constraint on the
secret key length. Here, we assume that the same number of data pulses is generated in
both the framed and frameless signaling schemes.
3.1 SYSTEMMODEL
3.1.1 Signaling scheme with a frame structure
Fig. 3.1 illustrates a frame UWB signaling scheme intended for coherent reception.
Given the b-bit secret keyK constraint, we aim to generateNf pulses in one symbol period
Ts, each of which uses k = b=Nf bits to specify a pulse position in each frame. As
described in the previous chapter, a transmitted signal s0(t) carrying the first information
bit b0 over the first symbol period is considered. Thus the signal transmitted by a single
user can be written as:
s0;frame(t) =
Nf 1X
i=0
(  1)b0pEp p(t   iTf   c0;iTp); (3.1)
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Figure 3.2. Signaling scheme with a frameless structure intended for coherent reception
where the parameters specified in the previous chapter hold in (3.1). Here, assuming the
pulse duration Tp and the frame duration Tf , the number of bits k used to select a position
index in f 0; 1; :::; 2k   1g in each frame can be expressed as:
k = log2(Tf=Tp): (3.2)
Accordingly, the total number of pulses in one symbol period specified by the b-bit
secret keyK is given by:
Nf = b=k =
b
log2(Tf=Tp)
: (3.3)
3.1.2 Signaling scheme with a frameless structure
Fig. 3.2 illustrates a frameless UWB signaling scheme intended for coherent reception.
We assumed that this frameless signaling scheme is constrained by the b-bit secret key
K and the total number of time slots Nt in one symbol period. In this signaling scheme
with a frameless structure, pulses can be located within any time slot in each symbol period.
Therefore, since there areNt = 2k  Nf = Ts=Tp time slots in one symbol period, k+log2Nf
bits are used to specify a pulse location. The total number of pulses transmitted in one
symbol period Np is given by:
Np =
b
k + log2Nf
=
b
log2(Ts=Tp)
: (3.4)
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Since the frameless signaling scheme uses extra bits log2Nf to decide the pulse location,
fewer pulses than those with a frame structure are supported by the constraint of the b-
bit secret key K. We also consider a transmitted signal s0;frameless(t) carrying the first
information bit b0 over the first symbol period. Thus the signal transmitted by a single user
can be expressed by:
s0;frameless(t) =
Np 1X
i=0
(  1)b0pEp p(t   e0;iTp); (3.5)
where e0;i 2 f 0; 1; :::; Nt   1g and the parameters specified in the previous chapter hold
in (3.1). The TH code element e0;i is to position the UWB pulse over the time slots in one
symbol period.
3.2 Performance of the systems
Consider the transmission of the signal s0;frame(t) and s0;frameless(t) over the AWGN
channel.
The received signals after passing through the front-end filter at the receiver can be
expressed as:
y0;frame(t) = s0;frame(t)  c(t) + n(t)  c(t) (3.6)
y0;frameless(t) = s0;frameless(t)  c(t) + n(t)  c(t) (3.7)
where c(t) is the impulse response of the front-end filter to eliminate the out-of-bandwidth
noise and n(t) is a zero-mean white Gaussian noise with two-sided power spectral density
N0=2.
3.2.1 Performance of adversary: UWB system with frames
Let the number of pulses that the adversary finds correctly in one symbol period be
the random variable X . X takes on a value less than or equal to d 2 f 0; 1; 2; ::::; Nf  
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1g . Similar to the systems intended for coherent reception in the previous chapter, the
probability of finding the correct pulse position in one is easily derived from the coherent
reception of orthogonal signals [9]:
pc; adv = p(y0;i < y0;c0;0 ; 8 i 6= c0;0)
=
Z 1
 1
241   Q
0@v + E sq
N0
2
1A352
b=Nf 1
 1p
N0
e
  v2
N0 dv
=
1p
2
Z 1
 1
[(1   Q(x))2b=Nf 1]e 
(x 
r
2Es
N0
)2
2 dx (3.8)
where x = v+Esq
N0
2
.
Noting
y0;c0;0  N(
p
E s; N0=2)
and y0;i  N(0; N0=2); i 6= c0;0:
Now, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the random variable X can be
derived as:
P(X  d) =
Nf 1X
d=0

Nf   1
d

pc; adv
d(1   pc; adv)(Nf 1 d); (3.9)
where d 2 f 0; 1; 2; ::::; Nf   1g .
3.2.2 Performance of adversary: UWB system without frames
The noise random variable is drawn from a zero-mean normal distribution with a vari-
ance N0=2, whereas the signal random variable has a normal distribution with a mean
p E s
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and a variance N0=2. The probability density functions (pdfs) of the signal and the noise
are given, respectively, by:
g(n) =
1p
2
e n
2=2 (3.10)
f(s) =
1p
2
e (s 
pEs)2=2: (3.11)
On the other hand, the adversary, lacking knowledge of the b-bit secret key K, selects
the largest Np values among the received signals and assumes them to be the correct data
pulses. We use order statistics to obtain the CDF of the random variable X , the number
of pulses that the adversary finds correctly in one symbol period. There are Np observed
values of the signal random variable and 2k  Nf   Np observed values of the noise random
variable. Here, the order statistic of rank l is the lth smallest value in the value set and is
denoted S(l) or N(l).
Note in particular that the minimum and maximum values considered are:
S(1) = minf S1; :::; SNp g (3.12)
S(Np) = maxf S1; :::; SNp g (3.13)
N2kNf Np = maxf N1; :::; N2kNf Np g : (3.14)
Therefore, the pdf of S(i), the ith smallest of S1; :::; SNp , is given as in [3] by:
f(i)(s) = Npf(s)

Np   1
i   1

(F (s))i 1(1   F (s))(Np i); (3.15)
and the pdf of N(j), the jth smallest of N1; :::; N2kNf Np , is given as in [3] by:
g(j)(n) = (2
k  Nf   Np)g(n)

2k  Nf   Np   1
j   1

(G(n))j 1(1   G(n))(2kNf Np j)
(3.16)
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Then, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the random variable X can be
derived as:
P(X  d) = P(more than Np   d noises are in the largest Np slots)
= P(((2k  Nf   Np)   (Np   d   1))th smallest noise > (Np   d)th smallest signal)
= P(N(2kNf 2Np+d+1) > S(Np d))
= ES(Np d) [P(N(2kNf 2Np)+d+1) > s(Np d))]
= ES(Np d) [
Z 1
s
g(2kNf 2Np+d+1)(n)dn]
=
Z 1
 1
f(Np d)(s)
Z 1
s
g(2kNf 2Np+d+1)(n)dnds
3.3 Numerical Evaluation
In this section, we compare the ability of the adversary under the framed signaling
scheme to detect the key versus the ability of the adversary under the frameless signaling
scheme to ascertain the key. The abilities of the adversaries for both framed and frameless
signaling schemes intended for coherent reception are represented in terms of the corre-
sponding CDF of X . Since the final expressions for the CDFs are in integral form, we
present numerical evaluation results. The frameless signaling scheme may offer better per-
formance than the framed signaling scheme since the adversary in the frameless signaling
scheme has to search not only for the time slots in each frame but rather the entire time
slots in one symbol period to find the data pulse. However, as mentioned earlier, if we
assume that the same b-bit secret keyK is available and there are the same number of time
slots provided in one symbol period, the frameless signaling scheme intended for coherent
reception has a lesser number of data pulses than those in the framed signaling scheme.
First, given the constraint of b-bit secret key K, we investigate whether the security of the
frameless signaling scheme outperforms that of the framed signaling scheme despite the
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difference in the number of pulses used to transmit data. Next, we assume that there is no
constraint on the secret key bits and thus the same number of data pulses is used in one
symbol period.
3.3.1 Same number of key bits used for both framed and frameless structures
b k Nf Np Performance
64 4 16 8 Framed is better: See Fig. 3.3
160 5 32 16 Framed is better: See Fig. 3.4
168 21 8 7 Frameless is better: See Fig. 3.5
192 12 16 12 Framed is better: See Fig. 3.6
352 11 32 22 Framed is better: See Fig. 3.7
384 6 64 32 Framed is better: See Fig. 3.8
Table 3.1. Experimental parameters in case of using the same number of secret key bits
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Figure 3.3. CDFs of the number of bits that the adversary detects. b=64, k=4, Nf=16 and
Np=8
Numerical results are presented here to compare the CDFs of the adversaries previously
obtained. For simplicity, only integer parameters are considered. Table 3.1 presents the ex-
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Figure 3.4. CDFs of the number of bits that the adversary detects. b=160, k=5, Nf=32 and
Np=16
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Figure 3.5. CDFs of the number of bits that the adversary detects. b=168, k=21, Nf=8 and
Np=7
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Figure 3.6. CDFs of the number of bits that the adversary detects. b=192, k=12, Nf=16
and Np=12
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Figure 3.7. CDFs of the number of bits that the adversary detects. b=352, k=11, Nf=32
and Np=22
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Figure 3.8. CDFs of the number of bits that the adversary detects. b=384, k=6, Nf=64 and
Np=32
perimental integer parameters satisfying the relationships of b; k;Nf and Np if the same
b-bit secret key K is used for both the framed and frameless signaling schemes. Compar-
isons of the CDFs are illustrated in Figs. 3.3 to 3.8. The upper curve indicates the superior
ability of the adversary to detect the secret key correctly. As seen from Fig. 3.5, the frame-
less signaling scheme slightly outperforms the framed signaling scheme at least one case.
In this case, the number of pulses generated to transmit data is almost the same sinceNf=8
and Np=7 as shown in Table 3.1. Otherwise, the framed signaling scheme performs better
than the frameless signaling scheme. If there is no significant difference between the num-
bers of the generated pulses, the security performance of the frameless structure inherently
outperforms that of the framed structure since the adversary has difficulty in finding the
pulses due to the expanded search window. However, if considerably more pulses satis-
fying the relationships of b; k;Nf and Np are generated in the framed signaling scheme,
finding all the pulses in the framed signaling scheme becomes more challenging than find-
ing the pulses with the expanded search window in the frameless signaling scheme.
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3.3.2 No limitation on key bits
Now we present the simulation result when the same number of pulses is generated in
both signaling schemes so that only the structure of the signaling scheme affects security
performance. We assume, given the number of pulses Nf in the framed signaling scheme
and total time slots Nt in one symbol period, that the same number of pulses Np = Nf
is generated in one symbol period in the frameless structures. That is, we have sufficient
secret key bits for positioning pulses, and thusNp = Nf . Table 3.2 shows the experimental
parameters when Np = Nf . Figs. 3.9 to 3.13 compare the CDFs of the number of bits
intercepted by the adversary for both the framed and frameless structures. As shown in
Figs. 3.9 to 3.13, the curve of the CDF in the framed signaling scheme is slightly above
that of the CDF in the frameless signaling scheme, meaning the frameless structure has
slightly better security performance than the framed signaling scheme. This is expected;
although there is the same number of pulses for the adversary to detect, the adversary in
the frameless case has to search the entire set of time slots in one symbol period to detect
the pulses with no structure.
b k Nf = Np Performance
64 8 8 Frameless is better: See Fig. 3.9
128 8 16 Frameless is better: See Fig. 3.10
128 16 8 Frameless is better: See Fig. 3.11
192 8 24 Frameless is better: See Fig. 3.12
192 16 12 Frameless is better: See Fig. 3.13
Table 3.2. Experimental parameters in case of the same number of pulses
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we proposed a frameless UWB signaling model to further strengthen
physical layer security by removing unnecessary structure from the transmitted signal.
Given the b-bit secret key K constraint, the numerical results demonstrates that the secu-
rity performance of the system of a frameless structure is superior to that of the system of a
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Figure 3.9. CDFs of the number of pulses that the adversary detects. b=64, k=8,Nf=Np=8
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Figure 3.10. CDFs of the number of pulses that the adversary detects. b=128, k=8,
Nf=Np=16
40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
# of pulses
cd
f
 
 
frame
frameless
Figure 3.11. CDFs of the number of pulses that the adversary detects. b=128, k=16,
Nf=Np=8
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Figure 3.12. CDFs of the number of pulses that the adversary detects. b=192, k=8,
Nf=Np=24
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Figure 3.13. CDFs of the number of pulses that the adversary detects. b=192, k=16,
Nf=Np=12
framed structure only if there is no significant difference between the numbers of the pulses
Nf and Np positioned in one symbol period. Otherwise, quite surprisingly, the framed sig-
naling scheme outperforms the frameless signaling scheme. We also examined the security
performance of both systems when there is the same number of pulses in one symbol pe-
riod. The security performance of the frameless signaling scheme outperforms that of the
framed signaling scheme, since the adversary in the case of the frameless signaling scheme
experiences difficulty in detecting the pulses due to the expanded search window.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
Traditionally, spread-spectrum systems have been employed to provide low probability-
of-intercept (LPI) and low probability-of-detection (LPD) performances at the physical
layer, but the messages transmitted over such a system are still encrypted with a powerful
cipher to protect their secrecy. Our challenge is to find a solution to provide an additional
level of security at the physical layer so that simple systems such as RFID tags with limited
resources can be secure without using standard encryption. It has recently been suggested
that the cryptographic security of the system can be enhanced by exploiting physical prop-
erties of UWB signals. With an eavesdropper observing the communications over multipath
channels between two legitimate partners sharing a secret key of a limited length, we con-
sider both coherent and reference-based UWB schemes to enhance security. The security
of the legitimate nodes is achieved by signal attributes based on the secret key, conferring
an advantage over the adversary.
In particular, in the first part, we propose UWB signaling schemes to improve physical
layer security when the transmission is intended for coherent reception and TR reception.
To evaluate the signaling schemes, we derive the error probabilities for the legitimate re-
ceivers and the adversaries for both transmission cases. Then we weigh the tradeoffs in
security performance of both baseline coherent and TR signaling schemes numerically in
IEEE 802.15.4a environments. Critical to the TR scheme is employing true randomness
to keep a sophisticated adversary from decoding the signal coherently. We investigate the
physical layer security performance of UWB systems intended for coherent reception and
UWB TR systems in IEEE 802.15.4a multipath environments. Numerical results for IEEE
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802.15.4a channel models reveal not only that the proposed schemes provide promising
support for higher-layer cryptographic protocols, but also, surprisingly, that the baseline
UWB TR system can demonstrate better security tradeoffs than the baseline UWB system
intended for coherent reception under the IEEE 802.15.4a channel model. Further, there
are numerous ways in which each of the schemes can be improved as well as in the many
adversary models that can be adopted. Among possible improvements, we could consider
removing the frame structure in both the UWB coherent and TR signaling schemes.
Accordingly, in the second part of the thesis, we consider removing the frame structure
of the UWB coherent signaling scheme, resulting in pulses that can be located anywhere
in the symbol period. Our hypothesis is that the frameless signaling scheme can make it
more difficult for the adversary to detect the pulses. For this, we first compare the CDFs of
the number of bits which the adversary can detect when the signaling schemes are based
on both the framed structure and the frameless structure given the same size secret key to
position the pulses. The numerical results demonstrate that the frameless structure slightly
outperforms the framed structure unless there is a significant difference between the num-
bers of pulses in both signaling structures. However, if there is no constraint on the size
of the secret key and thus, for example, there are the same number of pulses located in
one symbol period, the results reveal that the frameless structure is superior to the framed
structure in every example tested to date.
Our proposed signaling schemes could potentially suggest a solution for applications
relying on conventional cryptography, especially for low-data rate RFID systems.
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